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NOTE AND COMMENT
POWER OF THE U. S. SUPREME COURT TO ENFORCE JUDGMENTS AGAINST
STATEs.-In the year I46O, when the perogatives of sovereignty or at least
of the Crown were asserted in England much more vigorously than they are
today, "the Counseill of the right high and mighty Prynce Richard Duc of
York, brought into the Parliament Chambre a writyng conteignyng the
clayme and title of the right, that the seid Duc pretended unto the Corones
of Englond and of Fraunce, and Lordship of Trelond, and the same writyng
delyvered to the Right Reverent Fader in God George Bishop of Excestre,
Chaunceller of Englond, desiryng hym that the same writyng myght be
opened to the Lordes Spirituelx and Temporelx assembled in this present
Parlement, and that the seid Duc myght have brief and expedient answere
Whereupon the lords, apparently embarrassed by this extraorthereof."
dinary manifestation of confidence in them, declared "that the said writyng
shuld be radde and herd, not to be answered without the Kyngs commaundement, for so moche as the mater is so high, and of soo grete wyght
Vhen four days later the petition was again urgently preand poyse.'
incontynent all the seid Lordes Spirituelx and Temporelx
"therupon
sented
went to the Kyngs high presence, and therunto opened and declared the
seid mater, by the mouth of his said Chaunceller of Englond." The King was
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graciously pleased to command the lords that they should "serche for to
fynde in asmuch as in them was, all such thyngs as myght be objecte and
leyde ayenst the cleyme and title of the seid Duc." And though the King's
command could scarcely be regarded as indicating a judicial inquiry, the
lords in their extremity "sent for the Kyngs Justices into the Parlement
Chambre, to have their avis and Counsell in this behalf, * * * * sadly
to take avisament therin, and to serche and fynde all such objections as
myght be leyde ayenst the same, in fortefying of the Kynges right." Duke
of York's Claim to the Crown, 5 Rot. ParI., 375, I Wambaugh's Cas. Const.
Law, I.
Four and one-half centuries later the "sovereign state" of Virginia sued
the "sovereign state" of West Virginia to recover a sum of money alleged
to be due upon the agreement of West Virginia to assume its proportionate share of the debt of the old state of Virginia. The suit was brought in
the Supreme Court of the United States, which after prolonged consideration rendered judgment for the plaintiff. No execution or other compulsory process was issued, however. But now after delays for various reasons and pretexts urged by West Virginia the court is compelled to face the
problem of what if any compulsory powers it may exercise to enforce the
judgment. In its opinion rendered April 22 of this year, the Supreme
Court, when confronted with task of compelling, as did Parliament and the
King's Justices of old, finds the matter apparently "too high." Virginia v.
West Virginia, U. S. Supreme Court No. 2 Original, Oct. Term, 1917.
No wonder the court is embarrassed. For the question is one which involves difficulties of theory and policy, and can scarcely be settled by legal
principles and rules alone. At least though the case would be clear if between private parties, must not the court consider whether the character
of the parties as well as circumstances may alter cases?
The latest move in this extraordinary litigation which has now been
before the Supreme Court eight times, is an application by Virginia for process in the nature of mandamus to compel the legislature of West Virginia
to exercise its power of taxation to raise money wherewith to pay the judgment, West Virginia having no property subject to execution, unless it be
that used for government purposes. There is no express qualification or
limitation of the grant of jurisdiction in "controversies between two or more
states" to the Supreme Court. Unquestionably a grant of "jurisdiction"
includes, in cases between private parties, power not only to adjudicate, but
to issue compulsory process to enforce orders, judgments and decrees.
Wayinan v. Southard, io Wheat, i, 2, 3; Bank of U. S. v. Halstead, lo
Wheat, 57; Please v. Rathbun Jones Co., 228 Fed. z79; Knox Co. v Aspinwall..
24 How. 384. But the grant of jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in controversies between states and that in cases between private parties is in the
same clause and in language identical in legal significance.
How then can it be claimed that the grant in the first class of cases,
is less complete and comprehensive than that in the second? West Virginia
answers that it is because, as a State, her governmental powers cannot be
controlled or limited. But this position rests upon a theory of complete
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sovereignty, and admittedly our states are not completely sovereign. Does
the power contended for fall within that portion of the state's sovereignty
reserved to it, or is it not rather by the very grant referred to within that
portion surrendered to the federal government. There is no express limitation upon this grant of jurisdiction, no modification of the universally conceded legal signification of the term jurisdiction, and none can be implied unless it be by appeal to the character of the parties. But it is singular that in
so important a matter as this, the Constitution should delegate power to the
federal government by employing, unqualified and unrestricted a legal term
of well defined meaning, if in fact it was intended to limit that power to less
than the usual significance of the term employed.
There is very little in the records of the constitutional convention or
other contemporary material, to throw light upon the question. Chief Justice Wurrz's opinion deals very satisfactorily with this phase of the matter citing Elliott's Debates, and The Federalist, No. 81, as tending to show
that "jurisdiction" in its full legal significance was granted to the Court in
these controversies. The history of the particular clause of the Constitution
involved, may be traced in i Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention,
28, 244, 247, 298; 2 ibid. 146, 147, 157, 173, i86, 425, 6oi.
The fact that during the colonial period differences between the Colonies
though determined by a committee of the Privy Council, were enforced
either by royal decree or legislation by Parliament is not persuasive, for our
entire governmental machinery under English rule was totally different
from that existing after the Declaration of Independence. For the omnicompetence of Parliament, there was substituted a distribution of powers,
in which the matter in dispute, seems to be definitely assigned to the Supreme Court. See Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Peters, 657, 739, et
seq. and historical authorities cited in the margin of the opinion in the
instant case.
Under the Articles of Confederation (Art. IX) disputes between the
states were to be determined by a special commission or court to be appointed in each case by consent if possible, if not by congress, and the judgment, which was to be "final and conclusive," was to be "transmitted to congress, and lodged among the acts of congress for the security of the parties concerned." As was to be expected this bungling method was very
unsatisfactory in practice, and the dissatisfaction with the results obtained
and the significant omission under the Constitutional scheme of any provision for Congressional participation argue that the intention of the Federal Convention was to give that complete power to the Supreme Court,
which the legal meaning of "jurisdiction" implies.
The case of Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66, unquestionably lends
support to the West Virginia contention; but that case involved a phase
of the slavery question which was. already a cause of dangerous ferment,
and was decided by a court dominated by the extreme states' right theories of Taney, C. J., and four other appointees of President Jackson. From
a legal view-point the decision is an indefensible confession of judicial impotence, and while the case has never been overruled, it is perhaps signifi-
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cant that in the present opinion the Chief Justice does not so much as refer
to it. (See an article by W. C. Coleman, 31 HAxv. LAW RMV., 210.) It must
be admitted that statesmen of our early constitutional period, including such
staunch nationalists as Hamilton expressed doubt occasionally as to the
power of the federal courts to enforce judgments (See The Federalist,
No. 81) but this never became the accepted view of the courts, except perhaps in the unfortunate line of cases just referred to. Over against them
must be set the unquestionable shift of the center of power toward the
nation, which economic conditions, the Civil War, and the Civil War amendments, have accomplished. It is idle to deny that constitutional law is made
in this way.
Finally we have a long line of cases beginning with New York v. Connecticut, 4 Dall. i, and running to Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U. S.-in
which the jurisdiction over controversies between states was freely exercised. It is true that as the states in all these cases voluntarily gave effect
to the judgments, compulsion was not required, but that very fact argues that
the court's judgments were regarded as more than mere arbitral pronouncements. In South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U. S. 286, the court clearly
asserted its ability to enforce a money judgment against a state, a step,
however, which it became unnecessary to take because of subsequent developments. It should be noted, too, that four justices dissented, WHrrT,
C. J., writing the dissenting opinion. But the latter's opinion in the present
case must be taken as greatly modifying, if not a rejection of, his former
view.
Moreover in Van Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535, and many other cases
the Supreme Court has not hesitated to approve of the compulsion exercised
by the judicial power upon municipalities to enforce the levy of an authorized tax to pay judgments "rendered in consequence of a default in
paying the indebtedness." And while the difference between the municipal and the state legislatures must be recognized, never the less the former
as well as the latter exercises state governmental power.
While the step asked for by Virginia is opposed by many practical
difficulties, and is by no means free of doubt as to the soundness of its
legal theory, yet on the whole the wording of the constitutional grant of
jurisdiction and the logic of the situation point strongly to the existence of
the power claimed. And this seems to be the view of the Court for it declares: "In so far as the duty to award that remedy is disputed merely because authority to enforce a judgment against a State may not affect state
power, the contention is adversely disposed of by what we have said."
The suggestion of the Chief Justice that Congress may have power to
enforce the obligation of West Virginia is interesting, but cannot be adequately discussed within the space here available. The basis for such proposed action is the constitutional requirement that agreements between states
can be given validity only through the consent of Congress, from which
flows a general supervisory power in Congress, which under the doctrine
of McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, may be exercised by an appropriate legislation. There is much strength in this position, but in any proposed
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legislation for this purpose, care would have to be exercised to avoid interfering with judicial functions, or impairing already vested rights. Perhaps a general law drawn to provide a method of enforcing judgments
against states, and confining itself to "remedy," would afford the solution.
H. M. B.
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